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ABSTRACT 
 
The main objective of this paper is to strengthen the knowledge about the relationship be-
tween cooperation and political affiliation. For this purpose, I carry out an incentivized N-
person prisoner’s dilemma experiment. I find that left-wing voters cooperate more than 
right-wing voters in 3-person prisoner’s dilemmas. However, this difference in cooperation 
tapers off with group size due to a heterogeneous response to larger decision groups. While 
leftists cooperate less as the group size increases, I find no significant group size effect for 
rightists. These findings can partly be explained by differences in beliefs about the cooper-
ativeness of others, but a substantial part remains unexplained.  
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1. Introduction 
Cooperation is a fundamental element of human society. At all levels – from managing a 
small household, to passing a bill, to battling climate change – cooperation is at the center. To 
facilitate cooperation, and thereby social progress, we need to understand the determinants of 
cooperation as well as the underlying mechanisms. This paper focuses on one (possible) deter-
minant that has received surprisingly little attention: political ideology. As we stand before 
great challenges such as climate change and biodiversity loss, which will require extensive co-
operation by people from the entire political spectrum, it is important to identify behavioral 
similarities and differences. It is especially important to study the role of political ideology in 
the context of different decision group sizes given the large degree of variation in the situations 
we need to cooperate in. To tackle the challenges of today, we need to find ways to cooperate 
with a few coworkers, a dozen neighbors, thousands of strangers, and beyond. In this paper, I 
primarily investigate differences in cooperation rate between left-wing and right-wing voters 
when the decision environment is altered in terms of decision group size. I then explore whether 
beliefs can explain these behavioral differences. 
To this end, I conducted an incentivized, one-shot N-person prisoner’s dilemma (NPD; 
see Section 2 for a description) experiment in a web survey format. The participants were allo-
cated to one of three treatments. The NPD presented in each treatment varied in terms of group 
size. Three sizes were used: 3-person groups (SmallSize), 7-person groups (MedSize), and 25-
person groups (LargeSize). For more details about the experimental design, see Section 3. 
The main analysis of this paper is based on answers from 211 Swedish university students. 
I find that left-wing voters cooperate more than right-wing voters in 3-person prisoner’s dilem-
mas (PDs). However, this difference in cooperation tapers off with group size due to a hetero-
geneous response to larger decision groups. While leftists cooperate less as the group size in-
creases, I find no significant difference for rightists. In other words, the effect of larger group 
sizes is heterogeneous and varies with political affiliation. Subsequently, when the group size 
is set to 7 or 25, no significant difference in cooperation rate between leftists and rightists is 
detected. These findings can to some extent be explained by deviating beliefs about the other 
group members’ behavior, but a substantial part remains unexplained. 
The focus of this paper is on the cooperative behavior of people along the linear left-right 
political spectrum ranging from communism at the far left to socialism, liberalism, conserva-
tism, and finally fascism at the far right. One of the key features of this spectrum is the attitudes 
toward the economy and the government. While collectivism and government intervention is 
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favored by those to the left of the spectrum, individualism and the free market is favored by 
those to the right. If a broader definition of the political left-right dimension is adopted, addi-
tional value differences can be ascribed to the left and the right. Generally, the left is associated 
with concepts such as equality, progress, reform, and internationalism while the right is associ-
ated with for example authority, order, tradition, and nationalism (Heywood 2015). These de-
viating values may lead people to the left and the right of the political spectrum to behave 
differently when faced with a conflict between collective and individual interests. For example, 
given that previous research has found that inequality aversion is a driver of cooperation (e.g. 
Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Van Lange 1999), the stronger presence of egalitarianism within the left 
may lead leftists to cooperate to a greater extent than rightists. In addition, the larger degree of 
individualism, as opposed to collectivism, within the right might imply less concern for other’s 
outcomes. Thus, rightists may be more likely than leftists to prioritize their own interests. In-
deed, previous research has found that political affiliation is related to social value orientation 
(SVO), where SVO is a concept capturing a person’s concern for self and others’ outcomes. 
Specifically, people to the left on the political spectrum show more concern for others’ out-
comes than people to the right (see Balliet et al. 2018 for a meta-analysis). SVO has in turn 
been found to be positively related to cooperation in various situations (Van Lange et al. 1997; 
Balliet et al. 2009).  
Given that there is cause to suspect a relationship between political ideology and cooper-
ation, it is surprising how few studies have been conducted on the topic in the past.1 One paper 
that has addressed the question is Anderson et al. (2005). They studied public good contribu-
tions in relation to ideology using American undergraduate students but found no connection. 
However, they employed a sample of mere 48 students, while I use a sample of 211 students. 
Recently, another study was conducted in the U.S. in which the choices of Democrats and Re-
publicans were compared in a PD (Balliet et al. 2018). Unfortunately, in this experiment, the 
participants were informed about the political ideology of their co-player, which could explain 
why no relationship between political affiliation and cooperation was detected. Lastly, Fosgaard 
et al. (2019) studied how ideology relates to cooperation using a give- or take-framed public 
goods game (PGG) in which the participants were grouped into sets of four. They found that 
                                                 
1 Some research has been conducted on how political attitude relates to behavior in dictator game experiments. A 
few studies have reported that leftists give more than rightists in such games (Dawes et al. 2012; Cappelen et al. 
2017; Muller 2017). However, Thomsson and Vostroknutov (2017) were unable to detect a difference in giving 
between leftists and rightists. Moreover, Fisman et al. (2017) found that leftists are more equality-focused as op-
posed to efficiency-focused in a generalized dictator game. Heterogeneous behavior has been detected in other 
controlled experiments as well. In a preference elicitation task, Kerschbamer and Muller (2017) and Muller and 
Renes (2017) found that people on the right side of the political spectrum make selfish choices to a greater extent.  
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leftists contribute more than rightists in a take frame. In contrast, no significant difference was 
detected in a give-framed PGG.2 My paper adds to this literature by being the first to investigate 
cooperation differences due to political ideology in the context of fully anonymous PDs. In 
addition, I am the first to study the role of political ideology for cooperation when a large deci-
sion group size is employed. Of the three previously mentioned studies, Anderson et al. (2005) 
is the paper that uses the largest group size (eight members). Since we are currently facing 
pressing issues that will require large-scale cooperation, such as climate change and resource 
depletion, it is of utmost importance to have knowledge about how people with different ideo-
logies may differ in their responses to having to cooperate in larger groups. Thus, in my paper, 
a decision group of as many as 25 members is used, in addition to groups of seven and three 
members. 
By investigating cooperation differences due to political affiliation in differently sized 
groups, I also make a contribution to the literature on the group size effect. A number of em-
pirical studies have found evidence that cooperation decreases with increasing group size in 
NPDs (Marwell & Schmitt 1972; Kahan 1973; Hamburger et al. 1975; Bonacich et al. 1976; 
Fox & Guyer 1977; Komorita & Lapworth 1982; Grujić et al. 2012; Barcelo & Capraro 2015; 
Bosch-Domѐnech & Silvestre 2017).3 However, to the best of my knowledge, no research has 
been conducted on how the group size effect varies with political affiliation.  
A heterogeneous response is expected if leftists and rightists are affected differently by 
the mechanisms behind the group size effect. Unfortunately, little research has been conducted 
on the underlying mechanisms of the negative group size effect in NPDs. One hypothesis is that 
because the individual cost and individual benefit at full cooperation are constant with group 
size, but more people need to cooperate to reach said benefit, cooperation is expected to de-
crease with group size.4 This hypothesis is discussed in, for example, Barcelo and Capraro 
(2015). If the beliefs of leftists and rightists are heterogeneously affected by game characteris-
tics, which Fosgaard et al. (2019) found some empirical support for, it is possible that leftists 
                                                 
2 In short, a give frame implies that participants choose what amount to give to a common pool, while a take frame 
implies choosing what amount to take from a common pool.  
3 I find only one study that has reported a positive group size effect in NPDs, namely Duffy and Xie (2016). 
4 Changes in the diffusion of harm may be another explanation for the negative group size effect. As the group 
size grows, the harm directed to any single person by choosing to defect decreases. In other words, the impact of 
one individual’s action on the payoff for another group member diminishes with size. This concept of diffusion is 
discussed in Dawes (1980). If people tend to cooperate less as the diffusion of harm increases, we should observe 
less cooperation as the group size increases. Given that previous research has found that concern for others’ out-
comes is related to political orientation (see Balliet et al. 2018), leftists and rightists might respond heterogeneously 
to this diffusion of harm.  
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and rightists respond differently to the increased number of required cooperators due to deviat-
ing perceptions of the likelihood of a fellow student cooperating. 
A substantial body of previous literature has found empirical evidence that expectations 
regarding other people’s behavior are positively related to cooperation in social dilemmas (e.g., 
Deutsch 1960; Dawes 1980; Messic & Brewer 1983; Yamagishi 1986, 1988; Fischbacher et al. 
2001; Ferrin et al. 2008), which means that a person who believes that others cooperate is more 
likely to cooperate as well. To explore the role of beliefs in explaining cooperation differences 
associated with political ideology, I elicited the participants’ beliefs when they had completed 
the social dilemma by asking them to choose how many other students they believe had coop-
erated in the NPD.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of 
NPDs. Section 3 outlines the experimental design and implementation, Section 4 presents the 
results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemmas 
A social dilemma is a situation in which individual rationality and collective rationality 
are in opposition. One type of social dilemma is the so-called prisoner’s dilemma, where the 
participants have only two options: cooperate or defect. The PD is a social dilemma since the 
payoff to a single participant for defecting is always higher than the payoff for cooperating, but 
all participants receive a lower payoff if everyone defects compared with if everyone cooperates 
(see Dawes 1980). In the standard 2-person version, there are four possible outcomes: both 
participants cooperate (CC); Participant 1 cooperates while Participant 2 defects (CD); Partici-
pant 1 defects while Participant 2 cooperates (DC); and both participants defect (DD). From the 
perspective of Participant 1, the best possible outcome is defecting while Participant 2 cooper-
ates (DC); the next best outcome is full cooperation (CC); the third best outcome is full defec-
tion (DD); and the worst outcome is cooperating while Participant 2 defects (CD). The equiva-
lent ranking of outcomes applies to Participant 2 (Kollock 1998). 
The standard PD can be extended to include more than two participants, which is then 
referred to as the N-person prisoner’s dilemma. However, the properties of the dilemma change 
to some extent when there are more than two participants. Firstly, when one person chooses to 
defect in the PD, the harm of that decision is focused on the co-player, while the harm is diffused 
throughout the group in the NPD. Secondly, each participant in the PD knows what decision 
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their co-player made, whereas the decision is not necessarily revealed in the NPD. Thus, greater 
anonymity can be achieved in the NPD (Dawes 1980).5 
The characteristics of the NPD used in my experiment are typical within the literature: 
(1) the payoffs are symmetric, (2) the game is run once, (3) each participant can either cooperate 
or defect, (4) a strictly dominant strategy exists, and (5) full cooperation is the Pareto-efficient 
outcome. The payoff to Participant i for each possible outcome follows from Equation 1:6  
 
 
𝑏𝑋−𝑖
𝑁−1
− 𝑐𝐴𝑖, (1) 
 
 
where b is the benefit, c the cost, Ai a dummy taking the value 1 if Participant i chooses to 
cooperate, X-i is the number of cooperators other than i, and N is the total number of participants.  
Two key aspects of the NPD’s payoff structure are the benefit and the cost. My benefit is 
set to 48 SEK and the cost to 16 SEK,7 resulting in a benefit-cost ratio of 3 (48 divided by 16).8 
Table 1 presents the personal payoffs possible when Participant i chooses Option A (coopera-
tion) or Option B (defection) in the 3-person version of the NPD.9 See the appendix for tables 
containing the payoff matrices used in the 7- and 25-person versions.   
 
Table 1. 
Personal payoff matrix in the 3-person PD (SmallSize) when Participant i chooses Option A or B. 
 Choices of the other 2 participants in the NPD 
 Both cooperate 
One cooperates, 
one defects 
Both defect 
Option A 
(Cooperation) 
48 SEK 24 SEK 0 SEK 
Option B 
(Defection) 
64 SEK 40 SEK 16 SEK 
 
                                                 
5 If three people participate in the NPD and two people choose to defect, the third person knows the decision of 
the other two. Thus, greater anonymity is not certain in the NPD.  
6 The equivalent payoff structure is used in, e.g., Barcelo and Capraro (2015).  
7 Average in March, 2018, USD 1 = SEK 8.23 (Statistics Sweden 2017). Thus, b ≈ 5.8 USD and c ≈ 1.9 USD.  
8 Unfortunately, no standard benefit-cost ratio exists within the literature. My benefit-cost ratio of 3 is in accord-
ance with, e.g., Dreber et al. (2012) and Barcelo and Capraro (2015). 
9 Note that the choice of setting the lowest payoff to zero, instead of a positive integer, could affect the decision-
making in NPDs. Unfortunately, whether the lowest payoff is equal to zero or not varies between experiments. To 
name a few, Eiser and Bhavnani (1974), Dreber et al. (2012), and Barcelo and Capraro (2015) all use zero as the 
lowest possible payoff in their experiments.  
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3. Experiment 
The NPD experiment was conducted online, with a maximum payoff of 70 SEK per sub-
ject. The subjects were allocated to one of three treatments with different sized decision 
groups.10 As discussed by, e.g., Dawes (1980), a pair of individuals has characteristics that are 
distinctly different from those of a group. Since the interest of this paper is cooperation within 
groups, the small group size was set to three rather than two participants. The large group size 
was set to 25 participants, as this is the second largest group size for which the payoffs were 
guaranteed to be integers.11 Integer values were important to be able to provide the participants 
with their full earnings in cash. The medium size was then set to seven as this size also ensured 
integer payoffs and has been previously used in comparison with 3-person groups by Ham-
burger et al. (1975). Hence, the group sizes used were three (SmallSize), seven (MedSize), and 
25 (LargeSize).  
The experiment was executed by sending an email to the university email accounts of 
2,173 undergraduate students at the University of Gothenburg in March 2018. Reminders were 
sent 4–5 days after the first invitation. The students were enrolled in one of the following pro-
grams: Biology, Biomedical Analysis, Computer Science, Geography, Journalism, Law, Logis-
tics, Marine Science, Mathematics, Pharmacy, Physics, Political Science, Public Administra-
tion, Social Work, and Systems Science. Economics and business administration studies were 
not included in the sample since they may be too familiar with NPDs. On average, the partici-
pants earned 38.7 SEK, with a median of 38 SEK, or approx. 4.7 and 4.6 USD, respectively.12 
A blocking mechanism based on web browser cookies was applied to reduce the risk of 
students participating in the experiment multiple times.13 In the email, a link to the experiment 
was attached. The email and all instructions were written in Swedish to ensure that the partici-
pants would fully understand them (see the appendix for the translated instructions as well as 
screenshots of the original instructions). Upon opening the link, the experiment was introduced. 
The participants were then assigned to a treatment group based on whether they were born on 
an even (uneven) day in an even (uneven) month, which should result in a random allocation. 
                                                 
10 A fourth treatment, designed to study label framing, existed as well. In this treatment, the group size was set to 
25 but the NPD was referred to as “community dilemma” instead of “dilemma” in the instructions. Since the effect 
of label framing is not covered in this paper, the fourth treatment is not described in greater detail.  
11 The largest possible group size is 49 participants, but a group this big would result in an unreasonably long table 
of payoffs. As I deemed it important to provide the full list of payoffs to ensure that the participants had all the 
necessary information to make their decision, I chose the second largest group size (25 participants). 
12 Average in March, 2018, USD 1=SEK 8.23 (Statistics Sweden 2017). 
13 As the block was based on cookies, participants were unable to respond from the same device multiple times. 
However, if they used another device, they were not blocked. During the payment process, only one participant 
was discovered to have participated in the experiment twice. The second response was omitted from the analysis. 
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The experiment consisted of four parts. In the first part, the participants were informed 
about the NPD and asked to decide whether to cooperate or defect. In the second and third parts, 
they were asked to motivate their decision and asked how many others they believed cooperated 
in the NPD, respectively. In the fourth part, they were asked some background questions. After 
Part 4, the payment options (cash, SWISH – a Swedish smartphone money transfer service, or 
relinquish payment) were presented and the personal information required to be able to pay the 
subjects was collected. To avoid participants being affected by subsequent parts and changing 
their previous choices, they could not go back to a previous page while completing parts 1–4. 
After part 4, the participants were allowed to return to the previous page. 
In part 1, the participants were informed that they faced a dilemma together with 2, 6, or 
24 other students (the number of co-players depended on which treatment they had been allo-
cated to). The dilemma was introduced by describing the payoff mechanism, followed by four 
examples of extreme outcomes. The participants could also view the full list of possible out-
comes by clicking a button on the screen. The payoff structure applied in this paper is described 
in Section 2.  
After the dilemma had been introduced, the participants were asked to make their deci-
sion. Cooperation was labelled “Option A” and defection “Option B” to avoid any framing 
effect of strategy labels. After the participants had made their decision, they were asked whether 
it had been made randomly. If they answered “Yes,” they moved straight on to part 3, where 
their beliefs were assessed. If they answered “No,” the participants were asked to motivate their 
choice by picking 1–3 of the nine suggested reasons.  
After providing reasons for their decisions, the participants moved on to the belief elici-
tation part (part 3). To assess the subjects’ beliefs, they were asked to choose how many other 
students in their group they thought had picked Option A. If they provided the correct answer, 
they receive an additional 6 SEK. The instructions for the NPD were provided again to refresh 
their memory. For all treatments, there were three alternatives, corresponding to having low, 
medium, or high beliefs. For SmallSize, the alternatives were 0 students, 1 student, or 2 students. 
For MedSize, the alternatives were 0–2 students, 3–4 students, or 5–6 students. For LargeSize, 
the alternatives were 0–8 students, 9–16 students, or 17–24 students.14  
In the last part, the participants were asked questions about themselves (gender, age, in-
come, and field of education), their interest in community issues, their familiarity with the pris-
                                                 
14 Note that for MedSize and LargeSize, the first alternative (low beliefs) includes one more student than the other 
two alternatives, which was necessary to ensure realistic ranges. 
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oner’s dilemma, and how difficult they perceived the dilemma instructions to be. The partici-
pants were also asked what party they would vote for had it been Election Day. A list of the 
most common parties in Sweden was provided in alphabetic order: the Center Party, the Chris-
tian Democrats, the Feminist Initiative, the Green Party, the Left Party, the Liberals, the Mod-
erate Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Sweden Democrats.15,16 In addition, the par-
ticipants could choose “Don’t want to answer,” “Don’t know,” or “Other.” In the main analysis 
of this paper, subjects who chose one of the following parties were categorized as leftists: the 
Feminist Initiative, the Green Party, the Left Party, or the Social Democratic Party. Subjects 
who chose one of the remaining parties (the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, 
the Moderate Party, or the Sweden Democrats) were categorized as rightists.17 While I catego-
rize subjects as either left or right wing depending on party affiliation, Fosgaard et al. (2019) 
asked the subjects to place themselves on a political left-right scale (1=left and 10=right), where 
those who rated their views above 5 were categorized as rightists. 
4. Results 
The analysis is based on a total sample of 211 participants. Detailed information about 
the sample is available in the appendix. Note that an additional 107 students correctly completed 
the experiment. These students either answered that they did not know their political affiliation, 
did not want to disclose their affiliation, or specified a party not included on the list presented 
to them. As these participants cannot easily be categorized as rightists or leftists, they are ex-
cluded from the main analysis.18 
The results are presented in four subsections. First, I conduct a non-parametric analysis, 
followed by a regression analysis. To delve deeper into the role of political preferences, I em-
ploy three categories of political preferences (GAL, CEN, TAN) in the third subsection. In the 
last subsection, I present some robustness checks.  
                                                 
15 The Swedish names are: Centerpartiet, Kristdemokraterna, Feministiskt initiativ, Miljöpartiet, Vänsterpartiet, 
Liberalerna, Moderaterna, Socialdemokraterna, and Sverigedemokraterna.  
16 Traditionally, only the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Green Party, the Left Party, the Liberals, the 
Moderate Party, and the Social Democratic Party have been represented in the Swedish Riksdag. However, during 
the last decade, the Sweden Democrats, a far-right party, has grown in popularity and is now represented in the 
Riksdag. In addition, although the Feminist Initiative is not currently represented in the Riksdag, they can be 
considered a key party within the younger population and were thus included as an option. 
17 At the time of the experiment, two major “blocks” existed in Swedish politics: the Alliance (Alliansen) and the 
Red-Greens (de rödgröna). The former (consisting of the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and 
the Moderate Party) are considered to be the right-wing block, while the latter (consisting of the Social Democratic 
Party and the Green Party) are considered to be the left-wing block. During the election campaign of 2018, the 
parties within each block had declared an intention to jointly govern the country.  
18 As a robustness check, unsure voters are treated as a separate political affiliation category. When this is done, 
only 31 participants (9.7%) are excluded. 
 9 
 
4.1. Non-Parametric Testing 
Figure 1 displays the share of left-wing students (dark grey bars) and right-wing students 
(light grey bars) who cooperated in the NPD by treatment group. For leftists, the cooperation 
rate declines with group size (from 85% for 3-person groups to 71% for 7-person groups and to 
59% for 25-person groups). Using Fisher’s exact test, an overall p-value of 0.028 is obtained, 
which indicates that there is a negative group size effect for leftists. For rightists, on the other 
hand, no clear pattern is visible. Using the same test as for leftists, no difference in cooperation 
rate is significant for subjects categorized as rightists (p-value=0.705).  
 
 
Figure 1. The share of leftists (123 obs.) and rightists (88 obs.) who cooperated in each treatment. Error bars 
display Agresti-Coull intervals at the 95% confidence level.  
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for two linear probability models (LPM) with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. An LPM approach is used since all predictor variables 
are binary.19 In both models, the dependent variable is Cooperated, which takes the value 1 if 
the subject chose to cooperate. This variable is regressed on the treatment dummies; a dummy 
for rightists; a dummy for subjects older than the median age of 23; and a dummy for females. 
Additionally, in both models, political preference is interacted with treatment group, which 
means that the effects of the treatments are allowed to be heterogeneous. The base is leftists in 
                                                 
19 Probit (or logit) regression is not an appropriate approach when all the predictor variables are binary. 
0%
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40%
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the 3-person PD. In Model 2, the categorical variable Beliefs is included (Low Beliefs=0, Me-
dium Beliefs=1, and High Beliefs=2), where High Beliefs means that the participant believed 
that a high number of the other group members cooperated in the NPD.20 
 
Table 2 
Linear probability model regression. Dependent variable: Cooperation=1 for subjects who 
chose Option A. Base: leftists in 3-person PD, i.e., people who would vote for the Feminist 
Initiative, the Green Party, the Left Party, or the Social Democratic Party. 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
MedSize -0.162* -0.049 
 (0.09) (0.08) 
LargeSize -0.298*** -0.170* 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Right Wing -0.312*** -0.212** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Older (>23) 0.133** 0.069 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Female -0.037 -0.059 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
MedSize*Right Wing 0.253* 0.154 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
LargeSize*Right Wing 0.363** 0.242 
 (0.17) (0.15) 
Medium Beliefs  0.538*** 
  (0.08) 
High Beliefs  0.617*** 
  (0.08) 
Constant 0.824*** 0.318*** 
 (0.07) (0.10) 
Observations 211 211 
R-squared 0.067 0.294 
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.262 
Notes: MedSize=1 if group size is set to 7. LargeSize=1 if group size is set to 25. Right 
Wing=1 for subjects who would vote for the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the 
Liberals, the Moderate Party, or the Sweden Democrats. Older (>23)=1 for subjects older 
than the median age of 23. Medium Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed that around half 
of their co-players cooperated. High Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed that all or almost 
all of their co-players cooperated. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
First note that, in Model 1, the estimate for Right Wing is negative and statistically sig-
nificant (p-value=0.003). The point estimate implies that leftists are 31 percentage points more 
likely to cooperate than rightists in the 3-person PD. However, in the treatments with medium 
and large group size, no significant difference between leftists and rightists is detected. Specif-
ically, the coefficient for the Right Wing dummy is estimated to a mere -0.059 (p-value=0.587) 
                                                 
20 For SmallNeu, the alternatives were 0, 1, or 2 students. For MedNeu, the alternatives were 0–2, 3–4, or 5–6 
students. For LargeNeu, the alternatives were 0–8, 9–16, or 17–24 students.  
 11 
 
when the group size is 7, and to 0.051 (p-value=0.699) when the group size is 25.21 Indeed, 
when observing the interaction terms, which are positive and statistically significant, we learn 
that the left-right effect in the 3-person PD is significantly larger than the left-right effect in the 
7- and 25-person PDs.22 In other words, the left-right effect on cooperation diminishes with the 
size of the decision group. This can easily be viewed in Figure 2, which depicts the estimated 
share of cooperating leftists and rightists in each treatment group when both control variables 
are set to their respective mean. 
 
 
Figure 2. The estimated share of left-wing cooperators (solid line) and right-wing cooperators (dashed line) when 
the group size is set to 3 (SmallSize), 7 (MedSize), or 25 (LargeSize) and both covariates are held at their mean. 
The estimates are based on those obtained in Model 1, Table 2. The Y-axis is cut for improved visibility. 
 
 
As we see in Figure 2, the share of cooperating leftists declines while the share of coop-
erating rightists is more stable. If it is the case that the cooperativeness among leftists declines 
with group size while rightists are unaffected, this explains why the difference in cooperation 
between the left and the right diminishes with group size. To analyze the issue further, view 
Model 1 in Table 2 again and note that the treatment dummies reflect the estimated treatment 
effects for leftists alone. The coefficient for MedSize implies that leftists are 16 percentage 
points less likely to cooperate when the group size is 7 as opposed to 3 (p-value=0.072). Like-
wise, leftists are 30 percentage points less likely to cooperate when the group size is 25 as 
opposed to 3 (p-value=0.002). Thus, there is a negative group size effect for leftists. However, 
for rightists, the estimates for both MedSize and LargeSize are positive, close to zero, and not 
                                                 
21 To obtain the effect of Right Wing when the group size is 7 or 25, simply add the coefficient estimate for each 
interaction term to the estimate for Right Wing. In this manner, the effect when the group size is 7 is -0.312 + 0.253 
= -0.059. The effect of being a rightist when the group size is 25 is -0.312 + 0.363 = 0.051. 
22 The p-values for MedSize*Right Wing and LargeSize*Right Wing are 0.095 and 0.031, respectively. 
40%
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significant.23 Hence, I find no evidence in favor of a group size effect for rightists. In line with 
this, I find that the group size effect is significantly larger for leftists than for rightists (note the 
positive and significant interaction terms in Model 1, Table 2). Thus, the behavioral response 
to an increased group size differs between leftists and rightists.  
To explain these findings, I include the categorical variable Beliefs as a predictor variable 
in Model 2. As we can see in Table 2, the point estimate of Right Wing decreases in absolute 
magnitude by about a third of its value in Model 1. This suggests that Beliefs is to some extent 
mediating the left-right effect. However, note that the estimate is still significantly different 
from zero, which means that leftists cooperate more than rightists in 3-person PDs independent 
of Beliefs. Something other than deviating beliefs about others’ behavior is causing leftists to 
cooperate more than rightists when they are in a group of three people. Moreover, note that the 
estimated coefficients for both the treatments and the interaction terms are substantially reduced 
in size when controlling for Beliefs. In fact, the coefficient for MedSize and both interaction 
terms lose their significance. This implies that beliefs about others’ behavior mediate the neg-
ative group size effect for leftists as well as the heterogeneity of the group size effect.  
4.3. GAL-TAN 
To delve deeper into the role of political ideology for cooperation, the subjects are divided 
into three political preference groups based on the GAL-TAN scale in this subsection. The 
GAL-TAN scale is an 11-point scale coined by Hooghe et al. (2002) that captures the social 
left-right dimension ranging from 0 (green/alternative/libertarian; GAL) to 5 (center; CEN) to 
10 (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist; TAN). For a detailed description, see Bakker et al. 
(2012). To position the participants along the GAL-TAN scale, I employ the mean party posi-
tioning data supplied by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) for year 2017 (Polk et al. 2017). 
I then group the parties into three categories: GAL, CEN, and TAN. The following cutoffs are 
used to obtain fairly balanced sample sizes:  
 
 Categorized as GAL: 0 ≤ mean GAL-TAN value ≤  2  
 Categorized as CEN: 2 < mean GAL-TAN value ≤ 5 
 Categorized as TAN: 5 < mean GAL-TAN value ≤ 10 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 To obtain the treatment estimates for rightists alone, add each treatment effect for leftists to the corresponding 
interaction term. Thus, for rightists, the effect of MedSize is -0.162 + 0.253 = 0.091, while the effect of LargeSize 
-0.298 + 0.363 = 0.064.  
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Thus, the parties are categorized as follows:  
 
 GAL: the Feminist Initiative, the Green Party, and the Left Party. 
 CEN: the Center Party, the Liberals, and the Social Democratic Party. 
 TAN: the Christian Democrats, the Moderate Party, and the Sweden Democrats. 
 
4.3.1. GAL-TAN Regression Analysis 
Table 3 displays a reproduction of Table 2 where a political ideology variable based on 
the GAL-TAN scale is used instead of the traditional left-right division. The base in both Model 
1 and Model 2 consists of people affiliated with GAL parties in the 3-person version of the 
NPD. In the first model, we can observe that people with more traditional/authoritarian/nation-
alistic preferences cooperate significantly less than people with more green/alternative/libertar-
ian preferences when the group size is set to 3. Specifically, people affiliated with TAN parties 
are 24 percentage points less likely to cooperate than their GAL party counterparts (p-
value=0.048). Interestingly, this difference is almost as large as the point estimated difference 
in cooperation between people affiliated with GAL parties and those affiliated with CEN parties 
(-0.209; p-value=0.106), while the estimated difference between people affiliated with CEN 
parties and those affiliated with TAN parties is close to zero (-0.032; p-value=0.828). This im-
plies that people at the center and to the right of the social left-right scale act fairly similarly, 
while people to the left are the ones that stand out. However, this is only the case in the 3-person 
version. When the group size is increased to 7 and 25, no significant differences between the 
political categories are detected, in line with the findings in subsection 4.2, where a dichoto-
mous left-right classification is used. 
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Table 3 
Linear probability model regression. Dependent variable: Cooperation=1 for subjects who 
chose Option A. Base: GAL affiliated voters in 3-person PD, i.e., people who would vote 
for the Feminist Initiative, the Green Party, or the Left Party. 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
MedSize -0.092 -0.026 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
LargeSize -0.307*** -0.198* 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
CEN -0.209 -0.174 
 (0.13) (0.11) 
TAN -0.240** -0.191* 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Older (>23) 0.131* 0.068 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Female -0.044 -0.063 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
MedSize*CEN 0.074 0.074 
 (0.17) (0.15) 
LargeSize*CEN 0.320* 0.254 
 (0.19) (0.17) 
MedSize*TAN 0.044 0.071 
 (0.19) (0.18) 
LargeSize*TAN 0.193 0.165 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Medium Beliefs  0.539*** 
  (0.08) 
Low Beliefs  0.625*** 
  (0.08) 
Constant 0.832*** 0.337*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) 
Observations 211 211 
R-squared 0.062 0.295 
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.252 
Notes: MedSize=1 if group size is set to 7. LargeSize=1 if group size is set to 25. CEN=1 for 
subjects who would vote for the Center Party, the Liberals, or the Social Democratic Party. 
TAN=1 for subjects who would vote for the Christian Democrats, the Moderate Party, or the 
Sweden Democrats. Older (>23)=1 for subjects older than the median age of 23. Medium 
Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed around half of their co-players cooperated. High Be-
liefs=1 for subjects who believed that all or almost all of their co-players cooperated. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Moreover, in Model 1 of Table 3, note that the coefficient for LargeSize is negative and 
statistically significant. The estimate implies that parties to the left on the GAL-TAN scale 
cooperate 31 percentage points less when the group size is 25 as opposed to 3 (p-value=0.009). 
Thus, a negative group size effect is detected for people with green/alternative/libertarian views. 
No significant group size effect is found for people at the center or to the right on the GAL-
TAN scale. In addition, the interaction term LargeSize*CEN is positive and statistically signif-
icant (p-value=0.098), meaning that the group size effect for people affiliated with GAL parties 
is significantly different from the group size effect for people affiliated with CEN parties. This 
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can easily be viewed in Figure 2, which depicts the estimated share of cooperators in each 
treatment by position along the social left-right scale.  
 
 
Figure 2. The estimated share of cooperators affiliated with GAL-parties (squares), CEN parties (triangles), and 
TAN parties (circles) when the group size is set to 3 (SmallSize), 7 (MedSize) or 25 (LargeSize) and both covariates 
are held at their mean. The estimates are based on those obtained in Model 1, Table 3. The Y-axis is cut for 
improved visibility. 
 
To investigate the moderating effect of beliefs about others’ behavior, the categorical 
variable Beliefs is included in Model 2 in Table 3. In line with the findings when a dichotomous 
left-right categorization is employed, the results suggest that belief about the cooperativeness 
of others is an important mediating factor, but that additional factors are at play as well. In 
particular, observe that the coefficients of interest drop in magnitude, but do not necessarily 
turn statistically non-significant.  
4.4. Robustness Checks 
In the main analysis of this paper, the subjects who reported completing the experiment 
in a random fashion were dropped. As a robustness check, I include these observations and 
reproduce the regressions of Table 2 (see the appendix). The sample size then increases from 
211 to 227 students. The results are robust to including these additional students. 
As an additional robustness check, I employ narrower categories of political attitude (see 
the appendix). In these regressions, the subjects affiliated with parties outside the traditional 
left-wing and right-wing blocks in Sweden are dropped (the Feminist Initiative and the Sweden 
Democrats). Thus, the left parties in this robustness check are the Green Party, the Left Party, 
and the Social Democratic Party, while the right parties are the Center Party, the Christian 
40%
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Democrats, the Liberals, and the Moderate Party. The results are in line with those presented in 
the main analysis.  
Furthermore, since almost 25% of the experiment subjects did not know which party they 
would vote for and were thus dropped in the main analysis, Table 2 is reproduced using unsure 
voters as an additional political affiliation category (see the appendix).24 For leftists and right-
ists, the results are in line with those presented in the main analysis. Interestingly, the results of 
this robustness check suggest that unsure voters act similarly to rightists.  
5. Conclusions 
Cooperation is fundamental to human society. To facilitate cooperation, and thereby so-
cial progress, we need to understand the determinants of cooperation as well as the underlying 
mechanisms. This paper focused on one (possible) determinant that has received surprisingly 
little attention: political ideology. To strengthen the knowledge about this topic, I conducted an 
incentivized, one-shot N-person prisoner’s dilemma experiment where the group size was set 
to 3, 7, or 25.  
I found that left-wing voters cooperate significantly more than right-wing voters in 3-
person PDs. This is a novel finding within the literature. Only one previous study has been 
conducted on the link between political ideology and cooperation in PDs. Balliet et al. (2018) 
conducted a 2-person PD in the U.S. and compared the choices made by Republicans and Dem-
ocrats. However, the subjects were informed about the political affiliation of their co-player, 
meaning that they were not completely anonymous to each other. This experiment design could 
be the reason why Balliet et al. (2018) were unable to detect a difference in cooperation between 
Republicans and Democrats. On the other hand, it is possible that there indeed is no substantial 
link between political ideology and cooperation in the U.S., which is where Balliet et al. (2018) 
conducted their experiment. My results appear to be primarily driven by people of socialistic 
views, while people at the center and to the right of the political spectrum in Sweden act fairly 
similar. It is possible that the left side within American politics (Democrats) are located too far 
right on the spectrum to cause the differences observed in my experiment.  
Moreover, the left-right effect found in the 3-person version of my experiment was not 
detected in the 7-person and 25-person versions. Instead, I found that the difference in cooper-
ation between the left and the right significantly diminished as the group size grew, and that the 
reason for this diminishing left-right effect was a reduction in cooperation among leftists. As 
                                                 
24 When unsure voters are included, only 31 participants (9.7%) who did not want to disclose their political affili-
ation or who specified a party that was not on the list are excluded from the analysis.  
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the group size was increased from 3 to 7 and 25, leftists cooperated significantly less. This 
means that a negative group size effect was present for leftists, which is in line with previous 
literature (Marwell & Schmitt 1972; Kahan 1973; Hamburger et al. 1975; Bonacich et al. 1976; 
Fox & Guyer 1977; Komorita & Lapworth 1982; Grujić et al. 2012; Barcelo & Capraro 2015; 
Bosch-Domѐnech & Silvestre 2017). However, for rightists, the level of cooperation appears 
fairly stable across treatments and I found no evidence of a group size effect for people with 
right-wing views. Using regression analysis, I showed that the group size effect is in fact het-
erogeneous and varies with political affiliation, which is a novel finding in the literature. To the 
best of my knowledge, no previous attempts to study the heterogeneity of the group size effect 
have been made. Given the greater sensitivity to group size observed among leftists, to facilitate 
cooperation it might be advisable to exercise greater care when constructing decision groups if 
the population is predominately left wing as opposed to predominately right wing.  
Since issues of importance to society usually involve a great number of actors, it would 
in the future be interesting to investigate whether political ideology continues to have a minor 
impact on cooperation as the group size grows beyond 25 members. Since I found that the 
diminishing left-right effect was driven by a negative group size effect among leftists, it is pos-
sible that leftists continue to cooperate less and less as the group size grows. Hence, for a large 
enough group, the left might even exhibit significantly less cooperative behavior than the right.  
Moreover, I found that subjects’ beliefs about the cooperativeness of their group members 
can to some extent explain these results, which is in line with previous studies that have found 
that beliefs play an important role for cooperation (e.g., Deutsch 1960; Dawes 1980; Messic & 
Brewer 1983; Yamagishi 1986, 1988; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Ferrin et al. 2008). However, a 
large part remains unexplained. Further research is needed where additional factors, such as 
differences in cooperation preferences, are studied. See Fosgaard et al. (2019) for a suitable 
methodology. Unfortunately, in my experiment, no questions were asked to assess the subjects’ 
cooperation preferences.  
Furthermore, to delve deeper into the role of political ideology for cooperation, I repro-
duced the main analysis using a categorical variable based on the GAL-TAN scale. The parties 
were categorized as either GAL (green/alternative/libertarian), CEN (center), or TAN (tradi-
tional/authoritarian/nationalist). In this extension, we could see that people with views at the 
center or to the right on this social left-right scale act similarly to one another, while it is the 
ones to the left that stand out. Among those with more green/alternative/libertarian views, the 
cooperation rate starts off high but declines substantially with group size. 
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A limitation of the results of this paper concerns their generalizability. As shown in the 
appendix, although the political affiliation composition in this experiment is not far from the 
actual result of the 2018 general election in Sweden (held 6 months after the experiment), the 
subject pool does not completely reflect the political views in Sweden, especially concerning 
the two least established parties (the Sweden Democrats is underrepresented and the Feminist 
Initiative is overrepresented in my experiment). Nevertheless, the results are robust to excluding 
these two parties from the analysis.  
Moreover, the main analysis of this paper was based on participants who knew their po-
litical affiliation. However, almost 25% of the participants were not sure which party they 
would vote for. Thus, an analysis where unsure voters were treated as a political affiliation 
category was conducted. This analysis showed that unsure voters acted in a similar manner as 
rightists.   
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Appendix 
This document provides supplementary materials for the paper “Experimental Evidence on Co-
operation, Political Affiliation, and Group Size” by Ronja Helénsdotter.  
 
This document contains:  
1. A table presenting the main variables used in the analysis. 
2. Additional tables with descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
3. Table 2 of the main text using a narrower definition of the left and right wing catego-
ries. Specifically, subjects affiliated with the Feminist Initiative or the Sweden Dem-
ocrats are dropped.  
4. Table 2 of the main text using unsure voters as a political affiliation category. 
5. Table 2 of the main text including subjects who answered the NPD at random.  
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1. Variables 
Table A1 displays an overview of the variables used in the main text.  
 
Table A1 
Variable overview. 
  
Name Type Description 
Cooperated Dummy = 1 if chose to cooperate in the NPD. 
Treatment Categorical Three categories. SmallSize = 1 if in treatment with 3-person groups. 
MedSize = 1 if in treatment with 7-person groups. LargeSize = 1 if in 
treatment with 25-person groups.  
Right Wing Dummy = 1 for subjects who would vote for the Center Party, the Christian 
Democrats, the Liberal Party, the Moderate Party, or the Sweden 
Democrats. Right Wing = 0 for subjects who would vote for the Fem-
inist Initiative, the Green Party, the Left Party, or the Social Demo-
cratic Party. 
Older(>23) Dummy = 1 for subjects older than the median age of 23. 
Female Dummy = 1 for females. 
Beliefs Categorical Three categories (Low Beliefs, Medium Beliefs, High Beliefs). For all 
treatments, there were three alternatives which correspond to having 
low, medium or high beliefs concerning the number of others’ who 
cooperated in the NPD. For SmallSize, the alternatives were 0 stu-
dents, 1 student, or 2 students. For MedSize, the alternatives were 0-
2 students, 3-4 students, or 5-6 students. For LargeSize, the alterna-
tives were 0-8 students, 9-16 students, or 17-24 students. 
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2. Descriptive statistics 
The experiment was executed by sending an email to the university email accounts of 
2,173 undergraduate students at the University of Gothenburg in March 2018. On average, the 
participants earned 38.7 SEK, with median 38 SEK, which translate to approx. 4.7 and 4.6 USD 
in mean and median earnings, respectively.25 The sample size was set to 500, but since 40 of 
these 500 participants reported answering at random, their answers are excluded from the main 
analysis. In addition, four participants are excluded as they in their open-format motivation 
provided rationales that are incompatible with the instructions, e.g. stated that she/he defected 
to ensure that nobody would be left with 0 SEK. Thus, their answers make it evident that they 
did not understand the instructions. Four other participants are excluded as they reported that 
they were economics students or no longer students. Additionally, one student participated in 
the experiment twice. Consequently, the second entry from this participant is excluded. Finally, 
the participants had the opportunity to choose “Other” when asked about their gender, and since 
only three participants chose this option, they are not treated as an individual category. Instead, 
these three observations are dropped. Hence, the experiment yielded 448 valid responses.  
Since this paper focuses on the treatments in which only the group size varied, the obser-
vations in the fourth treatment, which is a community framed treatment, are dropped (130 stu-
dents). Moreover, 107 students completed the entire experiment, but answered that they i) did 
not know their political affiliation; ii) did not want to divulge their affiliation; or iii) specified 
a party not included on the list presented to them. As these participants cannot easily be cate-
gorized as rightists or leftists, they are excluded from the analysis as well. Thus, the main anal-
ysis of this paper is based on a total of 211 Swedish students.  
  
                                                 
25 Average for Mars, 2018, USD 1 = SEK 8.23 (Statistics Sweden 2017). 
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Table A2 displays the political affiliation composition including those who answered “Don’t 
know”, “Don’t want to answer”, or “Other”. 
 
Table A2 
Political affiliation composition (including Don’t know, Don’t want to answer, and Other).  
 Freq. Perc. Wing 
The Center Party 25 7.9% Right 
The Christian Democrats 5 1.6% Right 
The Feminist Initiative 17 5.4% Left 
The Green Party 22 6.9% Left 
The Left Party 44 13.8% Left 
The Liberal Party 6 1.9% Right 
The Moderate Party 40 12.6% Right 
The Social Democratic Party 40 12.6% Left 
The Sweden Democrats 12 3.8% Right 
Don’t know 76 23.9% - 
Don’t want to answer 20 6.3% - 
Other 11 3.5% - 
Total 318 100%  
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Table A3 displays the political affiliation composition of the sample employed in the main 
analysis. In my sample, which is comprised of primarily young Swedes, parties on the far left 
are overrepresented compared to the entire Swedish population. The most underrepresented 
party is the nationalistic party called the Sweden Democrats (almost 18% voted for the Sweden 
Democrats in the 2018 Election while only close to 6% of the subjects in my experiment 
claimed they would vote for the party). 
 
Table A3 
Political affiliation composition of the sample used in the main analysis.  
 Freq. Perc. 
Perc. in 2018 
Election* 
Wing 
The Center Party 25 11.8% 8.7% Right 
The Christian Democrats 5 2.4% 6.4% Right 
The Feminist Initiative 17 8.1% 0.5% Left 
The Green Party 22 10.4% 4.5% Left 
The Left Party 44 20.9% 8.1% Left 
The Liberal Party 6 2.8% 5.5% Right 
The Moderate Party 40 19.0% 20.1% Right 
The Social Democratic Party 40 19.0% 28.6% Left 
The Sweden Democrats 12 5.7% 17.7% Right 
Left Wing 123 58.3% 41.6%  
Right Wing 88 41.7% 58.4%  
Total 211 100% 100%  
*Source: Political affiliation composition figures obtained from the Election Authority, 2018. [Official Decis-
ion]. Fördelning av mandat i riksdagen och fastställande av vilka kandidater som har valts till ledamöter och 
ersättare. Number: 200 378253-18/98236. Available at: https://data.val.se/val/val2018/slutresultat/proto-
koll/protokoll_00R.pdf 
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Table A4 displays descriptive statistics of the main variables broken down by political affilia-
tion and in total. 
 
Table A4 
Summary statistics of main variables by political affiliation. Left Wing column is for 
subjects who would vote for the Feminist Initiative, the Green Party, the Left Party, or 
the Social Democratic Party. Right Wing column is for subjects who would vote for the 
Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, the Moderate Party, or the 
Sweden Democrats. 
 Left Wing Right Wing Total 
Treatment    
   SmallSize 32.5% 35.2% 33.7% 
   MedSize 34.2% 36.4% 35.1% 
   LargeSize 33.3% 28.4% 31.3% 
Older (>23) 51.2% 44.3% 48.3% 
Female 59.3% 53.4% 56.9% 
Beliefs    
   High Beliefs 36.6% 29.6% 33.7% 
   Medium Beliefs 45.5% 47.7% 46.5% 
   Low Beliefs 17.9% 22.7% 19.9% 
Obs. 123 88 211 
Notes: SmallSize=1 if group size is set to 3. MedSize=1 if group size is set to 7. 
LargeSize=1 if group size is set to 25. Older (>23)=1 for subjects older than the median 
age of 23. High Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed all or almost all of their co-players 
cooperated. Medium Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed around half of their co-players 
cooperated. Low Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed none or few of their co-players 
cooperated.  
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3. Narrower political affiliation categories 
Table A5 reproduces Table 2 of the main text using narrower grouping of the left and the right. 
Now, Right Wing=1 for subjects who would vote for the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, 
the Liberal Party, or the Moderate Party. Right Wing=0 for subjects who would vote for the 
Green Party, the Left Party, or the Social Democratic Party. 
 
Table A5 
Linear probability model regression with narrower political affiliation categories. Depend-
ent variable: Cooperation=1 for subjects who chose Option A. Base: leftists in 3-person PD, 
i.e., people who would vote for the Green Party, the Left Party, or the Social Democratic 
Party. 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
MedSize -0.207** -0.058 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
LargeSize -0.253** -0.116 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Right Wing -0.331*** -0.199* 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Older (>23) 0.130* 0.070 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Female -0.054 -0.071 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
MedSize*Right Wing 0.314* 0.115 
 (0.17) (0.15) 
LargeSize*Right Wing 0.374** 0.203 
 (0.18) (0.16) 
Medium Beliefs  0.598*** 
  (0.08) 
High Beliefs  0.611*** 
  (0.08) 
Constant 0.836*** 0.302*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) 
Observations 182 182 
R-squared 0.064 0.325 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.290 
Notes: MedSize=1 if group size is set to 7. LargeSize=1 if group size is set to 25. Right 
Wing=1 for subjects who would vote for the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the 
Liberal Party, or the Moderate Party. Older (>23)=1 for subjects older than the median age 
of 23. Medium Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed around half of their co-players cooper-
ated. High Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed all or almost all of their co-players cooper-
ated. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4. Unsure voters as political affiliation category 
Table A6 below reproduces Table 2 of the main text using unsure voters as a political affiliation 
category in addition to leftists and rightists.  
 
Table A6 
Linear probability model regression with three political affiliation categories. Dependent var-
iable: Cooperation=1 for subjects who chose Option A. Base: leftists in 3-person PD, i.e., 
people who would vote for the Feminist Initiative, the Green Party, the Left Party, or the Social 
Democratic Party. 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
MedSize -0.155* -0.052 
 (0.09) (0.08) 
LargeSize -0.290*** -0.170* 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Right Wing -0.307*** -0.212** 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
Unsure voter -0.196* -0.125 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Older (>23) 0.105* 0.081* 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
Female -0.007 -0.051 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
MedSize*Right Wing 0.248 0.160 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
LargeSize*Right Wing 0.352** 0.246* 
 (0.17) (0.15) 
MedSize *Unsure voter 0.119 0.058 
 (0.16) (0.14) 
LargeSize*Unsure voter 0.271 0.218 
 (0.17) (0.15) 
Medium Beliefs  0.519*** 
  (0.07) 
High Beliefs  0.645*** 
  (0.07) 
Constant 0.815*** 0.306*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) 
Observations 287 287 
R-squared 0.047 0.291 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.260 
Notes: MedSize=1 if group size is set to 7. LargeSize=1 if group size is set to 25. Right Wing=1 
for subjects who would vote for the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, 
the Moderate Party, or the Sweden Democrats. Unsure voter=1 for subject who did not know 
which party they would vote for. Older (>23)=1 for subjects older than the median age of 23. 
Medium Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed around half of their co-players cooperated. High 
Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed all or almost all of their co-players cooperated. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Including subjects who answered at random 
Table A7 below reproduces Table 2 of the main text including subjects who answered that they 
made their decision in the NPD at random. 
 
Table A7 
Linear probability model regression including subjects who made their decision in the NPD at 
random. Dependent variable: Cooperation=1 for subjects who chose Option A. Base: leftists 
in 3-person PD, i.e. people who would vote for the Feminist Initiative, the Green Party, the 
Left Party, or the Social Democratic Party.  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
MedSize -0.170* -0.058 
 (0.09) (0.08) 
LargeSize -0.297*** -0.171* 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Right Wing -0.320*** -0.206** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Older (>23) 0.145** 0.081 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Female -0.041 -0.056 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
MedSize*Right Wing 0.283* 0.188 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
LargeSize*Right Wing 0.355** 0.218 
 (0.16) (0.14) 
Medium Beliefs  0.507*** 
  (0.08) 
High Beliefs  0.608*** 
  (0.08) 
Constant 0.814*** 0.319*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) 
Observations 227 227 
R-squared 0.071 0.283 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.253 
Notes: MedSize=1 if group size is set to 7. LargeSize=1 if group size is set to 25. Right Wing=1 
for subjects who would vote for the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, 
the Moderate Party, or the Sweden Democrats. Older (>23)=1 for subjects older than the me-
dian age of 23. Medium Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed around half of their co-players 
cooperated. High Beliefs=1 for subjects who believed all or almost all of their co-players co-
operated. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Instructions 
This document provides the instructions given to participants of the N-person prisoner’s 
dilemma experiment on which the paper “Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Political Af-
filiation, and Group Size” by Ronja Helénsdotter is based on.  
 
This document contains:  
6. English translation of the email invitation. 
7. Screenshot of the email invitation in the original language (Swedish). 
8. English translation of the instructions. 
9. Screenshot of the instructions in the original language (Swedish). 
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1. Email invitation (translated) 
The translated version of the email invitation sent to the students is given below. 
 
Hi [field of education] student,  
 
If you complete my decision experiment that takes about 10 minutes you can get up to 70 kr. 
The experiment is part of my master thesis in economics.  
 
It is of course completely voluntary to participate, but at the same time you cannot be replaced 
by somebody else – your answers are important! In a scientific survey, it is important that peo-
ple of different views participate. 
 
Financing has been obtained from Centre for Collective Action Research at University of 
Gothenburg.  
 
Your answers will be anonymized before processing to assure anonymity.  
 
To participate, just follow the link:  
[Link given] 
 
Thank you for participating! 
Ronja Sundborg 
Supervisor: Elina Lampi 
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2. Email invitation (screenshot) 
Figure 2.1. Screenshot of email invitation.  
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3. Instructions (translated) 
The English version of the experiment instructions are given below.  
 
Welcome to this decision experiment. If you complete the whole experiment, you can receive 
up to 70 kronor depending on your choices and the choices of others. You can choose to be paid 
via SWISH or collect your money in cash at the School of Business, Economics and Law. De-
tails regarding payment are provided at the end of the experiment.  
 
The experiment takes about 10 minutes to complete and consists of four parts. 
 
It is important that you do not talk to anybody during the experiment and that you do not discuss 
the experiment with other students after you are done. 
 
Are you born on an even/uneven day in an even/uneven month? Example: If you are born 
on April 15, you choose the option “Uneven day and even month”. 
o Even day and even month 
o Uneven day and even month 
o Even day and uneven month 
o Uneven day and uneven month 
 
*Next page* 
 
For participants in the treatment SmallSize, the following version of part 1 was shown.  
Part 1: The dilemma 
Below are the instructions to the dilemma presented.  
*************************************** 
A computer chooses two other students at random so that you make up a group of three students 
together. The other students get exactly the same instructions as you. Neither you nor the other 
students will learn anything about each other at any point in time.  
 
You start the dilemma with 16 kronor and must choose Option A or B. If you choose Option A, 
you lose the 16 kronor while the other students get 24 kronor each. If you choose Option B, you 
keep the 16 kronor while the other students get nothing. Remember that all students face the 
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same decision, which means that the amount of money each student exits the dilemma with 
depends on the choices of all students.  
 
Below, you see some examples of possible outcomes.  
 
Dilemma examples: 
 If everybody chooses A, the dilemma is ended with everybody getting 48 kronor each. 
 If everybody chooses B, the dilemma is ended with everybody getting 16 kronor each. 
 If you choose A and all the other students choose B, the dilemma is ended with you 
getting 0 kronor and the other students getting 40 kronor 
 If you choose B and all the other students choose A, the dilemma is ended with you 
getting 64 kronor and the other students getting 24 kronor 
*************************************** 
If you wish to see all possible outcomes, you can click on “Open table” below. 
 
Figure 3.1. The table over possible outcomes that was shown when the participants clicked the “Open table” button.  
 
 
What option do you choose in the dilemma?  
o Option A 
o Option B 
 
 
For participants in the treatment MedSize, the following version of part 1 was shown.  
Part 1: The dilemma 
Below are the instructions to the dilemma presented.  
*************************************** 
A computer chooses six other students at random so that you make up a group of seven students 
together. The other students get exactly the same instructions as you. Neither you nor the other 
students will learn anything about each other at any point in time.  
IF YOU CHOOSE A IF YOU CHOOSE B
Number of others 
that choose A
Those that 
choose A get
Those that 
choose B get
Those that 
choose A get
Those that 
choose B get
0 participants 0 kr 40 kr - 16 kr
1 participants 24 kr 64 kr 0 kr 40 kr
2 participants 48 kr - 24 kr 64 kr
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You start the dilemma with 16 kronor and must choose Option A or B. If you choose Option A, 
you lose the 16 kronor while the other students get 8 kronor each. If you choose Option B, you 
keep the 16 kronor while the other students get nothing. Remember that all students face the 
same decision, which means that the amount of money each student exits the dilemma with 
depends on the choices of all students.  
 
Below, you see some examples of possible outcomes.  
 
Dilemma examples: 
 If everybody chooses A, the dilemma is ended with everybody getting 48 kronor each. 
 If everybody chooses B, the dilemma is ended with everybody getting 16 kronor each. 
 If you choose A and all the other students choose B, the dilemma is ended with you 
getting 0 kronor and the other students getting 24 kronor 
 If you choose B and all the other students choose A, the dilemma is ended with you 
getting 64 kronor and the other students getting 40 kronor 
*************************************** 
If you wish to see all possible outcomes, you can click on “Open table” below. 
 
Figure 3.2. The table over possible outcomes that was shown when the participants clicked the “Open table” button.  
 
 
What option do you choose in the dilemma?  
o Option A 
o Option B 
 
 
For participants in the treatment LargeSize, the following version of part 1 was shown.  
IF YOU CHOOSE A IF YOU CHOOSE B
Number of others 
that choose A
Those that 
choose A get
Those that 
choose B get
Those that 
choose A get
Those that 
choose B get
0 participants 0 kr 24 kr - 16 kr
1 participants 8 kr 32 kr 0 kr 24 kr
2 participants 16 kr 40 kr 8 kr 32 kr
3 participants 24 kr 48 kr 16 kr 40 kr
4 participants 32 kr 56 kr 24 kr 48 kr
5 participants 40 kr 64 kr 32 kr 56 kr
6 participants 48 kr - 40 kr 64 kr
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Part 1: The dilemma 
Below are the instructions to the dilemma presented.  
*************************************** 
A computer chooses twenty-four other students at random so that you make up a group of 
twenty-five students together. The other students get exactly the same instructions as you. Nei-
ther you nor the other students will learn anything about each other at any point in time.  
 
You start the dilemma with 16 kronor and must choose Option A or B. If you choose Option A, 
you lose the 16 kronor while the other students get 2 kronor each. If you choose Option B, you 
keep the 16 kronor while the other students get nothing. Remember that all students face the 
same decision, which means that the amount of money each student exits the dilemma with 
depends on the choices of all students.  
 
Below, you see some examples of possible outcomes.  
 
Dilemma examples: 
 If everybody chooses A, the dilemma is ended with everybody getting 48 kronor each. 
 If everybody chooses B, the dilemma is ended with everybody getting 16 kronor each. 
 If you choose A and all the other students choose B, the dilemma is ended with you 
getting 0 kronor and the other students getting 18 kronor 
 If you choose B and all the other students choose A, the dilemma is ended with you 
getting 64 kronor and the other students getting 46 kronor 
*************************************** 
If you wish to see all possible outcomes, you can click on “Open table” below. 
 
Figure 3.3. The table over possible outcomes that was shown when the participants clicked the “Open table” button.  
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What option do you choose in the dilemma?  
o Option A 
o Option B 
 
*Next page* 
Part 2(1): Motivation 
Did you choose A(B) at random? 
 No 
 Yes 
 
If the participant chose “No”, she/he moved on to part 2(2) on the next page. Otherwise, she/he 
moved straight on to part 3.  
Part 2(2): Motivation 
Below, a few suggested motivations are presented. Please choose those alternatives that you 
think best explain why you chose A(B) in the dilemma. You can choose at least one and at most 
three alternatives.  
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The following statements were randomized and only visible to participants who chose A.  
 I chose A because it is the choice I believe most other students in my group made 
 I chose A because it leads to the group getting most money in total 
 I chose A because I consider it to be the fair choice 
 I chose A because I care about others 
 I chose A because it feels good to help others 
 I chose A because I think that it is the ethically right thing to do 
 I chose A because I think that this choice is consistent with social norms 
 I chose A because it is the choice that I’d like everybody to make in this situation 
 I chose A for another reason 
 
The following statements were randomized and only visible to participants who chose B.  
 I chose B because it is the choice I believe most other students in my group made 
 I chose B because it is the most profitable choice for me 
 I chose B because I want to avoid getting 0 kronor 
 I chose B because I want to avoid being taken advantage of 
 I chose B because I don’t know who the other students are 
 I chose B because I don’t know what choices the other students made 
 I chose B because I think that the choice I make has a small impact on how much the 
other students get 
 I chose B because I believe that the probability that all students choose A is small 
 I chose B for another reason 
 
If the participant answered “I chose A(B) of another reason”, the following question appeared 
on the same page.  
Please shortly describe what other reason you had for choosing A(B). 
[Text box] 
 
*Next page* 
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For participants in the treatment SmallSize, the following version of part 3 was shown.  
Part 3: Other students 
You are now going to indicate how many of the other students in your group that you believe 
chose Option A in the dilemma. If the correct number matches your answer, you will get an 
additional 6 kronor.  
  
As a reminder, the instructions for the dilemma are provided one more time.  
 
[Instructions again.] 
 
How many of the other two students in your group do you believe chose option A in the 
dilemma? 
 0 students 
 1 student 
 2 students 
 
 
For participants in the treatment MedSize, the following version of part 3 was shown.  
Part 3: Other students 
You are now going to indicate how many of the other students in your group that you believe 
chose Option A in the dilemma. If the correct number matches your answer, you will get an 
additional 6 kronor.  
  
As a reminder, the instructions for the dilemma are provided one more time.  
 
[Instructions again.] 
 
How many of the other six students in your group do you believe chose option A in the 
dilemma? 
 0-2 students 
 3-4 students 
 5-6 students 
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For participants in the treatment LargeSize, the following version of part 3 was shown.  
Part 3: Other students 
You are now going to indicate how many of the other students in your group that you believe 
chose Option A in the dilemma. If the correct number matches your answer, you will get an 
additional 6 kronor.  
  
As a reminder, the instructions for the dilemma are provided one more time.  
 
[Instructions again.] 
 
How many of the other twenty-four students in your group do you believe chose option A 
in the dilemma? 
 0-8 students 
 9-16 students 
 17-24 students 
 
*Next page* 
Part 4: Final questions 
What is your gender? 
 Woman 
 Man 
 Other: [Text box] 
 
In what year were you born? Please write the whole year. 
[Text box] 
 
What is your typical monthly after-tax income in kronor (including governmental support 
and student loan)?  
 Less than 5,000 
 5,001 - 10,000 
 10,001 - 15,000 
 15,001 - 20,000 
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 20,001 - 25,000 
 More than 25,000 
 Don’t want to answer 
 
What is your field of education? 
 Pharmacy 
 Biology 
 Biomedicine 
 Computer science 
 Physics 
 Geography 
 Journalism 
 Law 
 Logistics 
 Marine science 
 Mathematics 
 Public administration 
 Social work 
 Political science 
 System science 
 Other: [Text box] 
 
What party would you vote for if it was Election Day today? 
 The Center Party 
 The Feminist Initiative 
 The Liberal Party 
 The Green Party 
 The Moderate Party 
 The Social Democratic Party 
 The Sweden Democrats 
 The Left Party 
 Don’t want to answer 
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 Don’t know 
 Other: [Text box] 
 
How interested are you in community issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means not at 
all interested and 5 means very interested? 
(not at all interested)          1           2             3            4            5          (very interested) 
 
How familiar are you with a game called “Prisoner’s Dilemma”? 
 I have no knowledge about the game 
 I have some knowledge about the game 
 I have good knowledge about the game 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means not at all difficult and 5 means very difficult, how 
difficult was it to understand the instructions to the dilemma according to you? 
(not at all difficult)          1           2             3            4            5          (very difficult) 
 
*Next page* 
The experiment is over 
A big thank you for your participation! 
 
If you choose SWISH, you will receive a SWISH payment during week 14. Due to tax reasons, 
you need to fill in your personal information on the next page if you choose SWISH.  
 
If you choose to collect your money in cash, you can do this outside the economic library on 
the following dates. More information concerning how you collect your money in cash is given 
on the next page. You will need to provide your phone number on the next page.  
 
Tuesday April 3rd between 09.00-12.00 
Thursday April 5th between 13.00-16.00 
 
All information that you on the next page provide to make payment possible will be separated 
from your previous answers to achieve anonymity.  
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If you choose to relinquish your payment, you do not need to fill in any more information. 
 
Do you want to be paid via SWISH, collect your money in cash or relinquish your pay-
ment? 
 I choose SWISH 
 I choose cash 
 I relinquish my payment 
 
Depending on the choice, the participant was directed to one of the following three pages. On 
each page, there was a “Send in” button. 
SWISH 
Participating in an economic experiment is an activity of independent character and does not 
constitute an employment relationship. Participants are therefore responsible with regard to fis-
cal consequences. An Income Statement will be sent to the Swedish Tax Agency if the com-
pensation exceeds 99 kr and a copy of the Income Statement (KU) will be sent to the payee. 
Because participants in this experiment can receive at most 70 kr, an Income Statement will not 
be sent for participants who have participated solely in this experiment at University of Gothen-
burg.  
 
Collected personal information will by University of Gothenburg be treated solely to enable 
payment for participation in experiments and provide the Swedish Tax Agency with an Income 
Statement when needed. University of Gothenburg saves the information for 10 years. By trans-
mitting personal information, the information provider accepts that such information is treated 
in accordance with Personuppgiftslagen (1998:204).  
 
If you have any questions, you can email beslutsexperiment2018@gmail.com. 
 
Department of Economics 
School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg 
Vasagatan 1, E533 
411 24 Gothenburg 
Organization number 202100-3153 
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I hereby certify that I in Mars 2018 via internet have participated in an economic experi-
ment sent by a master’s student at the School of Business, Economics and Law, University 
of Gothenburg. 
o Yes 
 
Please fill in your phone number. You are responsible for providing a correct phone num-
ber and that it is connected to SWISH.  
[Text box] 
  
Please fill in your e-mail address. 
[Text box] 
 
Please fill in your full name. 
[Text box] 
 
Please fill in your civic registration number. 
[Text box] 
 
Please fill in your home address. 
[Text box] 
Cash 
To receive your money, you need to provide the same phone number upon collection as you fill 
in below. You collect your money outside the economic library. The library is located on the 
floor above the main entrance to the School of Business, Economics and Law, Vasagatan 1. 
You get your money from a representative dressed in a dark blue T-shirt with the school’s logo 
on. You can collect your money on the following dates: 
 
Tuesday April 3rd between 09.00-12.00 
Thursday April 5th between 13.00-16.00 
 
If you have any questions, you can e-mail beslutsexperiment2018@gmail.com. 
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Please fill in your phone number. You need to provide the same phone number upon col-
lection.   
[Text box] 
 
If you want the instructions about how you collect your money to be sent to your email, 
you can type in your e-mail address.  
[Text box] 
Thank you for your participation! 
Because you have chosen to relinquish your payment, you do not need to fill in any more in-
formation.  
 
If you have any questions, you can e-mail beslutsexperiment2018@gmail.com. 
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4. Instructions (screenshots)  
Figure 4.1. Screenshot of initial page of the experiment. 
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Figure 4.2a. Screenshot of part 1 if treatment is SmallSize.  
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Figure 4.3a. Screenshot of part 1 if treatment is SmallSize. Shown if subjects clicked on the 
“Open table” button (Öppna tabell).  
 
  
 50 
 
Figure 4.2b. Screenshot of part 1 if treatment is MedSize. 
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Figure 4.3b. Screenshot of part 1 if treatment is MedSize. Shown if subjects clicked on the 
“Open table” button (Öppna tabell).  
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Figure 4.2c. Screenshot of part 1 if treatment is LargeSize. 
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Figure 4.3c. Screenshot of part 1 if treatment is LargeSize. Shown if subjects clicked on the 
“Open table” button (Öppna tabell). 
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Figure 4.4a. Screenshot of part 2(1). Shown to subjects who chose Option A (Alternativ A). 
 
 
Figure 4.4b. Screenshot of part 2(1). Shown to subjects who chose Option B (Alternativ B) 
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Figure 4.5a. Screenshot of part 2(2). Shown to subjects who chose Option A (Alternativ A) 
and did not answer the question at random. The GU logo is removed from the screenshot to 
increase visibility. 
 
 
Figure 4.5b. Screenshot of part 2(2). Shown to subjects who chose Option B (Alternativ B) 
and did not answer the question at random. The GU logo is removed from the screenshot to 
increase visibility. 
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Figure 4.6a. Screenshot of part 3 if treatment is SmallSize. 
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Figure 4.6b. Screenshot of part 3 if treatment is MedSize. 
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Figure 4.6c. Screenshot of part 3 if treatment is LargeSize. 
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 Figure 4.7. Screenshot of final questions. 
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Figure 4.8. Screenshot of final questions. 
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Figure 4.9. Screenshot of final questions. 
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Figure 4.10. Screenshot of payment alternatives. 
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Figure 4.11a. Screenshot of payment alternatives (SWISH). 
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Figure 4.12a. Screenshot of payment alternatives (SWISH). 
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Figure 4.11b. Screenshot of payment alternatives (cash). 
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Figure 4.11c. Screenshot of payment alternatives (relinquish payment). 
 
 
 
